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The Impact of the Supreme Court
on Trends in Economic Policy Making
in the United States Courts of Appeals
Donald R. Songer
University of South Carolina
Previousimpact researchhas primarilyinvestigatedcontroversialcivil libertiesdecisions.
The presentstudy examinesthe responseof the United StatesCourtsof Appealsto changes
in the laborand antitrustpolicies announcedby the SupremeCourtbetween 1950and 1977.
Significantimpact was discovered. In each policy area, the decisional trendsof the courts
of appeals underwenta significantchange after each of two policy shifts on the Supreme
Court.Changesin the decisionaltrendsof the courtsof appealwere in the predicteddirection
even after controlswere introducedfor judges'party and holdover effects.
L
a recent assessment of research to date in judicial impact, Johnson
and Canon (1984) suggest that too much attention has been given to
following up a very few dramaticSupreme Court decisions. They argue
that "in focusing on the extraordinary,we have forgotten the ordinary.
We believe a complete understandingof the processin the implementation
and impact of judicial policies must also include data about cases less
heralded but nonethelessstill important"(1984,p. ix). This concentration
on the dramatic has meant that most empirical research dealt with the
impact of a highly biased sample of Supreme Court policies: mainly
controversial civil liberties decisions-especially those of the Warren
Court (Baum, 1978). Wasby's(1970) admonitionmore than a decade ago
that there was a need for more analysis of the impact of the Court on
economic policy has gone virtuallyunheeded. Even though the Supreme
Court devotes considerable energy to economic policy, the impact of its
work in this field has been virtuallyignored (Baum, 1977, p. 132).
A potential danger of such a limited research focus is that the overall
impact of the Supreme Court may be seriously underestimated.
Controversialpolicies may be precisely those in which the impact of the
Supreme Court on lower courts is at its minimum (Baum, 1978, p. 210;
Johnsonand Canon, 1984, pp. 58-60). Shiftingthe focus of analysisto the
Court's economic policy-making may contribute to a more balanced
assessment of its overall impact on lower courts. While substantively
important, the Court's economic decisions have rarely generated the

'The authorwishes to expresshis appreciationfor the Project'87 grantwhich partially
funded the researchreportedin this paper.
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degree of passionand controversythathave followed some of its decisions
on race relationsand criminalprocedure.Consequently,theirimpact may
be greater. For example, Wasby (1970, p. 103) suggests that "an area of
law in which it is often speculated that considerableimpact has occurred
is antitrust,but much of what has been written is speculation; we are
without studies to match the speculation."
The present study attempts to redress partiallythe balance in impact
studies with an analysisof the impact of the Supreme Court on economic
policy-making in the United States Courts of Appeals. The focus is on
the laborand antitrustdecisionsof the courtsof appeals from 1950through
1977.
Much of the literatureon the impact of the Supreme Court on lower
courts has dealt with their compliance with specific decisions of the
Supreme Court. Althoughsuch studies have illuminatedsome significant
problems, a compliance focus inevitably misses much of the dynamics
of the relationshipsbetween courts in our federal system. Lower courts
may fail to support the basic policy of the Supreme Court without being
overtly noncompliantwith any specific decision (see Wasby, 1970, ch. 2
for a discussion of the problem). As Beatty (1972, p. 261) puts it, there
are many ways for courtsto "avoid,mitigateor nullify the rulingor advice
of the Court" which stop short of overt defiance or noncompliance.
Therefore, to gain a more complete understandingof the significance of
the constitutional rules announced by the Supreme Court, a broader
concept of impact needs to be used. A furtherproblem with the use of
a compliance model is that the focus on a few selected decisions is too
narrow to gauge the impact of the Court on a given policy area. Canon
(1973) maintains that the central significance of the Court for
constitutionaldevelopment is not the specific decisions it makes but the
broad policies it fashionsfrom a series of decisions. Baum (1977)expands
on this idea to argue that much of an appellate court'spolicy leadership
is exercised throughthe establishmentof decisional trends that signal its
inclination without creating a complete set of explicit rules of law. He
suggests that there is a great need for research designed to measure the
response of lower courts to these more general "decisional trends" of
appellate courts in a wide variety of policy areas.
The analysisreported below examinesthe policy leadershipexerted by
the Supreme Court on the labor and antitrustdecisional trends in the
United States Courts of Appeals. It is generally believed that judicial
decisions which lack clarity because of their complexity are less likely to
have positive impact on the courts below (Johnsonand Canon, 1984, p.
49). Since labor and antitrustpolicies are by naturecomplex (Johnsonand
Canon, 1984,p. 32), it might be speculatedthatthe impact of the Supreme
Court in these policy areas will be relatively modest. However, if the
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directionof SupremeCourtpolicy is substantiallyaltered througha series
of decisions,the overallchange in the decisionaltrendsof the Courtshould
be quite clear even if the details of some specific decisions remain
somewhat ambiguous.Therefore, the capability of the SupremeCourt to
influence the decisional trends of lower courts should not be hampered
by the complexity of its decisions. Since labor and antitrustdecisions of
the Supreme Court have not generally stimulated widespread intense
controversyand since there are no other obvious environmentalpressures
on the lower courts to disregard Supreme Court policy leadership, it is
expected that the Court will have a substantialimpact on the labor and
antitrustdecisions of the courtsof appeals. Specifically, it is hypothesized
that after any statisticallysignificant change in the percentage of liberal
decisions announced by the Supreme Court in either of the policy areas
under investigation,there will be a statisticallysignificant change in the
same direction in the percentage of liberal decisions announced by the
United States Courts of Appeals.
DATA AND METHODS

The initial analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court was based on
all of the labor and antitrustdecisions of both the Supreme Court and
the United StatesCourtsof Appealsthatwere publishedwith full opinions
(includingper curiam opinions) from 1950 through1977.1The sample of
antitrustdecisions of the courts of appeals was extended backwards in
time to 1947 after a preliminaryexaminationsuggested that there were
too few cases in the earlier period studied to permit adequate analysis.2
Duringthis period there were a total of 160 such SupremeCourtand 1153
appeals court decisions in the area of antitrustpolicy and 221 Supreme
Court and 4454 appeals court labor decisions. Decisions were classified
as liberalor conservativefollowing the widely used definitionof liberalism
most fully described by Goldman (1966).
The first step in analysis was to compute the percentage of liberal
decisions made by the Supreme Court in each calendar year for each
1 Labor cases consisted of all cases which involved the resolutionof a significantissue
included in the "laborrelations"topic of the West Key Number System, except those in
which an individual as plaintiff raised an equal protection claim against a union or
corporation.Suitsbetween unionswere also excluded. Mostlabor cases thereforeinvolved
disputes between a union and a company or between employees and their employer.
Antitrustcases involved all civil suits in which the plaintiffalleged violationof an antitrust
law (primarilythe Shermanor Clayton Acts) or in which the defendant raised a counter
claim based on the antitrustlaws to resista patentinfringementor breachof contractclaim.
Included in both the labor and antitrustcategories were appeals from federal regulatory
agencies (e.g., the NationalLaborRelationsBoard)and the Federaldistrictcourts.
2 A list of the citations of the cases used in analysismay be obtained from the author.
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policy area (see appendix).3It was next necessary to determine precisely
when and to what extent the decisional trends in Supreme Court labor
and antitrustpolicy-making actually did change. An examinationof the
datasuggeststhattherewere two dramaticchangesin the decisionaltrends
of the Supreme Court in each policy area. In labor policy, the Supreme
Courtbecame significantlymore liberalafter 1958and then took a decisive
turnback to the right after 1969. Overall, the Supreme Court announced
liberaldecisionsin 54.3%of its opinionsin the period 1950-1958;79.8%were
liberal in 1959-1969,and 43.0%were liberal in 1970-77. A difference of
proportions test (Z) demonstrates that both of these changes are
statisticallysignificantat the .001 level.
More traditional analyses also suggest that significant changes in
Supreme Court policy occurred at approximately the same time. For
example, Theodore J. St. Antoine states that the WarrenCourt's"main
achievement in the labor field involved a simple but fundamental
restructuringof intergovernmentalrelations.What the court did . .. was
to nationalize the regulation of labor relations in industries affecting
interstatecommerce" (1968, p. 126). The first definitive statement of this
new policy came in the 1959 case of San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Garmon,359 U.S. 236 (St. Antoine, 1968, p. 128; Shapiro, 1964, p. 85).
The shift back to a more conservativeinterpretationof labor policy began
in 1970 when the Burger Court announced its decision in Boys Markets
Inc. v. Retail Clerk Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, the first of several decisions
which expressly overruledtwo of the WarrenCourt'sprouniondecisions
and underminedthree others (St. Antoine, 1983, p. 166).
In antitrust policy the Supreme Court decisional trends became
decidely more liberal after 1956 and then turned back in a conservative
direction after 1973. During the 1950-1956period, 40.6%of all Supreme
Court decisions were liberal. The liberal proportionjumped to 79.5%for
the 1957-1973period and then fell back to 37.0%for the 1974-1977period.
Both changes in the proportion of liberal decisions are significant at the
.001 level.
Traditionalanalyses also lead to the conclusion that the Warrenand
BurgerCourtspresided over significantshifts in Supreme Court antitrust
policy. Kauperwrites that "noone could quarrelwith the simple assertion
that the so-called 'WarrenCourt' has had a significant, if indeed not
extraordinary,impact on the development of antitrustlaws"(1968,p. 134).
The first of the WarrenCourt'smajorantitrustdecisions, which marked
the first time that the Court has applied the Clayton Act to vertical
mergers,occurredin 1957in the case of United Statesv. DuPont,353 U.S.
586 (Shapiro, 1964, pp. 276-77). The DuPont case was quickly followed
I Each decision of either the SupremeCourt or the courts of appeals which affirmed in
partand reversedin partthe decisionbelow was scoredas half liberaland half conservative.
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by a number of cases, such as the 1958 decision in NorthernPacific Ry.
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, in which the WarrenCourt declared a
wide variety of vertical restraintsto be illegal and systematicallybegan
to resolve apparent conflicts between patent and antitrustlaws in favor
of the latter (Kauper, 1968, p. 136). The swing back to the right began
with two key decisions in 1974. Markovitsargues that the 1974 decision
in United States v. MarineBancorporation,418 U.S. 602, was the first of
several in which the Burger Court "indicated that the test of antitrust
legality is the effect of the acts in questionon competitionratherthantheir
impact on populist democracy or the independence and survivalof small
businessmen"(1983, p. 180). Also in 1974, the Burger Court announced
its decision in United States v. GeneralDynamics Corporation,415 U.S.
486, which was the key case on horizontalmergers which repudiatedthe
"WarrenCourt'sapparentconclusion that virtuallyall horizontalmergers
are anticompetitiveand hence unlawful"(Markovits,1983, p. 186).
After determining that Supreme Court policy did, in fact, change
significantlyin each policy area,decisionaltrendson the courtsof appeals
were examined to determine whether they changed in the same direction
in the period immediately following the change in SupremeCourtpolicy.
The basic unit of analysis was the percentage of liberal decisions
announcedby the courts of appeals in each policy area for each calendar
year (a listing of the results by year is provided in the appendix). The
periods used to analyze appeals court decisions are lagged one year to
assurethat appeals courtjudgeshad time to become familiarwith changes
in SupremeCourtpolicy. The basic test of the hypothesiswas to determine
whether the proportion of liberal decisions on the courts of appeals
changed to a statisticallysignificantdegree after the policy change on the
Supreme Court. Since it is predicted that the decisional trends of the
SupremeCourtand the courtsof appealswill change in the same direction,
a one-tailed difference of proportionstest is utilized.
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

The data in table 1 demonstratethat with a one-year time lag, the labor
decisionaltrendson the courtsof appeals followed the change in Supreme
Court policy as predicted by the hypothesis. After the dramaticincrease
in Supreme Court liberalism, the percentage of liberal decisions in the
courts of appeals increasedby 9.1%,a difference that is significantat the
.001 level. However, the response by the courts of appeals following the
Supreme Court'sreturnto a more conservative orientationis somewhat
ambiguous. Although the courts of appeals also became more
conservative, the magnitude of the change was much more modest, and
the difference failed to reach the .05 level of significance.
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TABLE 1

PROPORTIONOF LIBERAL DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
DURINGPERIODS OF CHANGING SUPREME COURT POLICY: LABOR CASES

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

Z

5.06

p<.001

1.11

p=.l

1950-59

51.0%

(1113)

1960-70

60.1

(2194)

1971-77

58.1

(1147)

The data in table 2 also support the hypothesis. Following the Warren
Court'sadoption of a decidedly more liberal antitrustpolicy, the output
of the courts of appeals also became more liberal. The increase of 8.5%
is significant at the .02 level. The response of the courts of appeals
following the turn back to the right by the Supreme Court was also
decisive. For the period 1974-1977,the proportion of liberal decisions
rendered by the courts of appeals fell 8.6%from its previous level, a
difference that is significantat the .02 level.
TABLE 2
PROPORTIONOF LIBERAL DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS
DURINGPERIODS OF CHANGING SUPREME COURT POLICY: ANTITRUST CASES

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

Z

1947-57

34.2%

(199)

2.18

p<.02

1958-74

42.7

(731)

1975-77

34.1

(223)

2.26

p<.02

Althoughthe findingsare not without some ambiguity,they do provide
considerable support for the hypothesis. Following each of the four
changes in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court, the trends in the
courts of appeals moved in the same direction. In three of the cases the
differences were statistically significant and in the remaining case the
differences were only moderately less than that required for statistical
significance.

Althoughthese changesin the decisionaltrendson the courtsof appeals
are consistent with the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact, alternative
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explanationsare possible. It is well established that there are frequently
partisan differences in the voting behavior of appeals court judges
(Goldman, 1966, 1975), and in fact, party differences are evident in the
data analyzed above. In labor cases, 57.0%of the votes cast by Democratic
judges were liberal compared to 52.0%for Republican judges-a
difference which is significant at the .001 level. In antitrust policy
Democrats also cast liberal votes more frequently than their Republican
counterparts:42.7%compared to 38.5%.These differences are significant
at the .01 level. The existence of such partisan differences raises the
possibilitythat the changesin the decisionaltrendsof the courtsof appeals
may be due to changes in the partisancomposition of the lower courts
ratherthan to any Supreme Court influence.
In order to assess this alternativeexplanation, the votes of individual
judges are analyzed in each time period with a control for the party of
the appointing president. The data are displayed in tables 3 and 4. The
TABLE 3
CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PROPORTIONOF LIBERAL VOTES CAST BY
DEMOCRATICAND REPUBLICANJUDGES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS:
LABOR CASES

REPUBLICANS

DEMOCRATS

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

1950-59

46.4%

(1245)

1960-70

54.6

(2780)

1971-77

51.9

(1529)

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

1950-59

52.0%

(1688)

1960-70

59.8

(2959)

1971-77

57.4

(1167)

Z

4.82

p<.001

1.69

p<.05

Z

4.87

p<.001

1.41

p=.08

changes in the voting patterns of Republican judges are consistent with
the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact. For both labor and antitrust
policy, the proportion of liberal Republican votes increased to a
statistically significant degree after the Warren Court policies became
establishedand then decreased to a statisticallysignificantextent after the
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policy changes adopted by the Burger Court. Democratic judges also
followed the trends set by the Supreme Court in both labor and antitrust
policy, and the magnitude of the changes was significant at the .01 level
in three of the four cases. Althoughthe proportionof the liberalvotes cast
by Democratic judges is higher than the corresponding figure for
Republicanjudges in each of the three time periods for both policy areas,
it is significant that the trends over time for both parties follow the
direction of the changes enacted by the Supreme Court.
TABLE 4
CHANGES OVERTIME IN THE PROPORTIONOF LIBERAL VOTES CAST BY
DEMOCRATICAND REPUBLICAN JUDGES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS:
ANTITRUST CASES

REPUBLICANS

DEMOCRATS

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

1947-57

30.1%

(186)

1958-74

41.5

(1023)

1975-77

34.2

(360)

PERIOD

%LIBERAL

(N)

1947-57

37.5%

(371)

1958-74

46.3

(961)

1975-77

36.6

(262)

Z

2.92

p<.Ol

2.43

p<.Ol

Z

2.93

p<.Ol

2.77

p<.Ol

This finding that the voting patternsin both parties followed Supreme
Court trends strengthensthe support for the proposition that the court
has had a significant impact on the decisional trends of the courts of
appeals and that the observed changes in the courts of appeals were not
due to personnel turnover. However, the use of a party control is only
a partial test of turnover effects. Since significant presidential
appointment effects have been noted even within parties for federal
judges (Carp and Rowland, 1983), the possibility remains that the
observed changes were produced by the appointmentof judges after the
SupremeCourt policy shift who were ideologically more in tune with the
new policy than were previously appointed judges. Although no
independent measureof judges' ideologies was available, this alternative
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was explored by comparing the voting tendencies of holdover judges
before and after the changes in Supreme Court policy.4 Such an analysis,
however, supports the original hypothesis rather than the alternative
explanationthatnew judgeswere responsiblefor changesin the decisional
trends of the courts of appeals. In labor policy, the proportionof liberal
votes cast by holdover judges increased from 49.6%prior to 1960to 57.3%
in the middle period and then decreased to 55.9%after 1970.5In antitrust
policy, the proportionof liberal votes cast by holdover judges increased
from 37.8%to 46.8%.The holdovers from the period 1958to 1974decreased
their support for liberal outcomes from 43.9%to 35.2%after 1974.6
If the Supreme Court does have a significant effect on the decisions
of appealscourtsjudges,then policy changesadopted by the Courtshould
create new precedents which authoritatively settle some previously
unsettledquestionsand/or which requirethatpreviouslysettled questions
now be decided in a different manner. Songer (1982) has argued that a
significantproportionof the cases decided by the courtsof appealsshould
be classified as "consensual"cases because the precedents relevant to the
decision are so clear and so generally perceived to be binding that all
judges, regardlessof their ideology, will feel constrainedto decide them
in the same way. His findings suggested that unanimousaffirmancesby
the courts of appeals are almost always such consensual cases. But if
Supreme Court policy change results in new, clear, binding precedents,
the cases which would be consensual in one time period might not be
consensualin the next period. Therefore,the decisionaltrendseven among
these "consensual"cases in the courts of appeals should follow changes
in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court if the thesis of the present
study is correct.To test this proposition,the decisionaltrendsin the courts
of appeals for unanimousaffirmances of the district court or regulatory
agency decision below were analyzed.
The resultssupportthe originalhypothesis.For both labor and antitrust
cases, the proportion of liberal decisions consistently moves in the
I A judge was classifiedas a "holdover"or a "new"judge on the basis of theirappointing
president ratherthan their individual date of appointment.Althoughsuch a convention,
necessitatedby the way in which the data were coded, may introducesome inaccuracies
(e.g., for labor policy, those few Eisenhowerjudges appointed in 1960 were classified as
holdovers), it does not seem likely that it would significantlyaffect the results.The only
break point between time periods located in the middle of a presidentialadministrationis
the division of the first two periods for antitrustpolicy. Consequentlya separateanalysis
was performedon all Eisenhowerappointees,and none were classifiedas holdoverjudges.
Eisenhowerjudges increasedtheir proportionof liberalantitrustvotes from 30.6%to 41.3%
after 1957,a change significantat the .05 level.
5 For the first change, the combined N=6601,Z=6.42,P<.001. The second change does
not reach the .05 level of significance(Z=1.05).
6 For the first change, the combined N=848,Z=2.73,P<.001. For the second change, the
combined N=2571,Z=3.78,P<.001.
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expected direction. For antitrust policy both changes are statistically
significant, while for labor policy only the first change reaches at least
the .05 level of significance
In summary, the analysis reported above suggests that the Supreme
Court exercises considerable impact on the general trends in economic
policy-makingin the United StatesCourtsof Appeals.Even when analysis
was confined to judges of a single party, holdover judges, or consensual
cases, the trendsin the courtsof appeals followed the changesin decisional
trendsof the SupremeCourt. The findings reported above of shifts in the
decisional trends of the courts of appeals following policy changes in the
outputof the SupremeCourtdo not provide definitive proof of causation.
It remains possible, for example, that statutory changes or changes in
Justice Departmentprosecutionpolicy were responsible for the shifts on
both courts. However, in the absence of any direct evidence to support
these alternative explanations, they appear less plausible than the
hypothesis of Supreme Court impact.
The majorunexplainedfinding was the failureof the change in the labor
decisions of the courts of appeals after 1970 to reach normal standards
of statisticalsignificance. The data displayed in table 3 suggest that this
failurewas due solely to the responseof Democraticjudges.Althoughtheir
voting decisions moved in the expected direction, the magnitude of the
change was quite modest. A tentative explanationof these results might
be found in the suggestionof Carpand Rowland (1983)thatthe guidelines
coming from the Burger Court were more ambiguous than those
emanatingfrom the WarrenCourt.Consequently,judgesmay have gained
relativelymore freedom to take theirdecision-makingcues from personal
and partisanvalues after 1970ratherthan from guidelines set forth by the
High Court.

7For antitrustpolicy, the proportionof liberal decisions increased from 22.3%(N=121)
to 30.0%(N=417)in the middle period and then falls to 18.9%.For the first change, Z=1.67,
P<.05. For the second change, Z=2.27,P<.02. For labor policy the proportionof liberal
decisionsfor each period is 66.6%(N-598), 73.0%(N=1187),and 70.2%(N=662).For the first
change, Z=2.78,P<.01. For the second change, Z=1.27,P=.10.
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APPENDIX
PERCENTAGEOF LIBERAL
DECISIONSIN THESUPREMECOURTANDTHE
UNITEDSTATESCOURTSOFAPPEALS
BY YEARANDPOLICYAREA

Labor Cases
SupremeCourt
AppealsCourt
%Liberal
N
N
Year %Liberal
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

29%
16
33
67
100
50
64
62
50
67
85
83
81
67
100
64
50
100
75
100
60
42
44
60
29
50
43
33

7
3
9
12
3
5
14
13
4
9
13
3
13
9
13
11
6
8
4
5
5
7
8
5
12
7
7
6

33%
40
58
52
55
57
48
47
59
48
51
56
61
60
57
58
60
63
57
63
66
56
64
59
62
57

63
85
92
150
166
122
128
94
99
121
154
150
167
249
189
160
199
326
153
216
230
250
155
143
150
149

AntitrustCases
SupremeCourt
Appeals Court
N
%Liberal
%Liberal
N
33%
33
0
16
57
100
50
80
40
83
100
50
89
57
100
60
100
100
75
89
100
70
67
71
50
20
12
50

6
6
2
6
7
3
2
5
5
6
4
4
9
7
8
5
6
10
8
9
1
5
6
7
8
5
4
6

36%
33
55
31
29
37
40
32
46
39
43
35
38
43
53
43
45
51
30
44
51
42
48
43
29
30

22
9
11
18
29
19
29
25
26
32
28
24
33
35
44
38
47
40
42
40
59
53
53
62
75
85
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